


On the Table: Water, Energy and North American Integration

September 4, 2007

Embargoed until 9:00 am Sept. 10, 2007

Andrew Nikiforuk

 the program on water issues



About this Paper: “On the Table: Water, Energy and North American Integration” was prepared by Andrew Nikiforuk on behalf of the Program on Water Issues, Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto. Significant contributions to the paper were made by David Boyd, David Cameron, Chad Day, Mark Mattson, Adele Hurley, Ralph Pentland, Frank Quinn and Owen Saunders.

About the Author: Andrew Nikiforuk is a Calgary based journalist and an award winning business and environmental reporter. In 2002 he won the Governor General’s Award for Non-Fiction. He writes a regular column for Canadian Business magazine.

About the Program on Water Issues: The Program On Water Issues (POWI) creates opportunities for members of the private, public, academic, and not-for-profit sectors to join in collaborative research, dialogue, and education. The Program is dedicated to giving voice to those who would bring transparency and breadth of knowledge to the understanding and protection of Canada's valuable water resources. Since 2001, The Program On Water Issues has provided the public with analysis, information, and opinion on a range of important and emerging water issues. Its location within the [Munk Centre for International Studies](#) at the University of Toronto provides access to rich analytic resources, state-of-the-art information technology, and international expertise. This paper can be found on the Program On Water Issues’ website at www.powi.ca. For more information on POWI or this paper, please contact

Adèle M. Hurley
Director, Program On Water Issues
1 Devonshire Place, South House, Room 258S
Toronto, Ontario
Canada
M5S 3K7
Tel: 416-892-8919 Fax: 416-946-8915 E-mail: hurleyut@istar.ca

Program support from the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation and the Tides Canada Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.

Table of Contents

Foreword	ii
Introduction	1
The Big Idea: The North American Community	2
Water: Another Trade Good?	4
The SPP Water Agenda: “A Most Sensitive Topic”	6
Water: The Growing Thirst	9
The SPP and the Energy/Water Nexus	13
Continental Water Follies: The Myths of Abundance and Wealth	17
Environmental Trade-Offs	21
Water: A Matter of National Responsibility	22
Moving Forward	24
Appendix A Energy and Water Integration: A Partial SPP Chronology	26
Endnotes	31

If you are dependent on people who do not know you, who control the value of your necessities, you are not free and you are not safe.

Wendell Berry

Foreword

This paper is about Canada's water. Since the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1993 there has been pressure to allow trade in Canadian water. This pressure has increased with the establishment in 2005 of the Security and Prosperity Partnership. In a very real sense, Canada's water is already "on the table" as our current legislation does not protect it from being traded away.

Most Canadians recognize the United States as Canada's best trading partner and friend, and understand that trade between the two countries is vital to both economies. Yet Canadians and Americans also prize the principle of independence. They understand that whenever a nation no longer controls the necessities of life, its citizens are no longer free or safe. The controversial idea of continental water integration or "interdependence" is based on one of two assumptions. The first of these is that Canada has a "surplus" of water and therefore, large amounts of water can be moved from one basin in Canada to another in the US without unduly affecting the environment. The second assumption is that water, like oil or gas, is a tradable commodity and that it is permissible to trade it and run the risk of degrading one place for the benefit of another.

We believe that both of these assumptions are false. This paper subscribes to the principle that wise management, prudent conservation and responsible stewardship of water are absolutely necessary for the long-term environmental health and economic prosperity of both countries. This principle can be paraphrased as "**Keep water within its natural basin, treat it with respect, and use it efficiently.**"

Canada and the United States have a long history of valued friendship. Good friends bring discipline to their water households, not by draining the neighbour's pool, but by living within their means. It is hoped that this paper contributes to the important open dialogue that needs to take place on Canada's fresh water resources.

Adèle M. Hurley
Director, Program On Water Issues
Munk Centre for International Studies
University of Toronto

Introduction

Every year the North American Forum on Integration, a Montreal organization dedicated to greater continental cooperation, holds a mock North American parliament called “Triumvirate.” More than a mere exercise, Triumvirate provides insight into prevailing thinking on the economic and political issues that Canada, Mexico and the United States will face in the near future. At the most recent session, in May 2007, 73 university students from the three countries gathered at American University in Washington DC; in mock debate they discussed a broad range of issues including customs unions, telecommunications and human trafficking.¹

But water made the biggest splash.

Members of the United States delegation openly pushed for bulk water shipments from their northern trade partner. The Canadians balked, arguing that water exports posed “a national security threat.” In the end the delegates agreed that Canada’s position was “un problema para el futuro” (“a problem for the future”).²

But the American delegation considered it a problem for now. During the week-long session, they demanded that Canadians support a proposal to provide 10 percent of their annual duties for the purposes of continental defence. If the Canadians refused, the Americans promised to push for greater “access to Canadian natural resources” including water.³ The dominant trading partner prevailed: the Canadians ultimately acquiesced and agreed to pay for a North American defence perimeter.

Although organizers characterize the Triumvirate as an exercise “beyond any cultural reality”, Louis Alberta Moreno, the president of the Inter-American Development Bank, put the affair into clearer perspective. “The Triumvirate is an excellent example of the importance and depth of North American integration,” said Moreno. “If this integration was not really happening, you wouldn’t be sitting here right now.”⁴

As long as its status as a negotiable resource remains unclear, pressure to access Canada’s water will continue to grow ever stronger.

Nor would you be reading this paper.

Make no mistake, Canada’s water – through diversion, transfer, sale, trade or all of the above – is on the negotiating table in Canada/US relations. While water is not necessarily the top item of negotiation, and at times is dormant as an issue, it is there. In the long-term agenda within the context of freer trade and increased North American integration, Canada’s water is up for grabs. As long as its status as a negotiable resource remains unclear, pressure to access Canada’s water will continue to grow ever stronger.

There is now a formal framework for discussing Canada’s water as a trade item – the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) – which met most recently in August 2007 at Montebello, Quebec under the auspices of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, US President George W. Bush and Mexican President Felipe Calderon.

While this summit focused publicly on other continent-wide issues, the concept of trade in water has remained quietly but persistently present under the larger banner of trade relations. Ever since Canada, the United States and Mexico signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993, a small group of academics, former government officials and business leaders have actively pushed for “deeper economic

integration.” After 9/11 and Canada’s ascendancy as the number one supplier of oil to the United States, the “NAFTA Plus” movement began to seriously develop plans for better security, harmonious regulations and seamless borders.

In 2005, these plans were formalized: the leaders of Canada, Mexico and the United States quietly established the SPP to accelerate the continent’s commitment “to markets and democracy, freedom and trade, and mutual prosperity and security.” The SPP is little-known but very important: it has established minister-led working groups with more than 300 priorities, agendas and timelines in order to achieve, as one business group put it, “a rolling harvest of accomplishments.”⁵ Since then, the SPP has been responsible for changes to border security, harmonization of pipeline regulations, a lowering of pesticide rules, and plans to prepare for avian flu. As many as nine working groups are now promoting the integration of oil, gas and electricity markets.⁶ Climate change now falls under the SPP umbrella of North American integration.⁷

In the absence of a credible Canadian energy strategy or climate change program, the SPP’s agenda of North American integration is filling a political void. Will water be next?

Given the impact of climate change on water availability as well as the dramatic water intensity of unconventional oil production, the subject of continental water sharing has surfaced as part of the integration agenda. In the absence of a credible Canadian energy strategy or climate change program, the SPP’s agenda of North American integration is filling a political void. Will water be next? And will Canada allow economic integration to enlarge the continent’s economic boundaries so far that we will no longer have control over our lakes and rivers?

The Big Idea: The North American Community

If the Security and Prosperity Partnership has one abiding shepherd, it is Robert Pastor, currently Vice President of International Affairs at American University. For nearly a decade the prolific scholar has appeared before business groups, think tanks and legislative galleries arguing the merits of deeper continental integration. The House of Commons calls him “one of the most active academic proponents of a North American community.”⁸

His formal political crusade began in August of 2001. That’s when the former Latin American affairs director at the US National Security Council forwarded a big, bold idea. What if the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) had missed its mark and not gone far enough? What if it had been too narrow and timid?⁹

The controversial trade agreement had already boosted trade and helped North America’s gross product outstrip that of Europe, but Pastor argued that the “North America Community” now needed a comprehensive political vision akin to the European Union. To “deepen NAFTA” and compete globally, the continent now required more sophisticated political institutions.

“Can sovereignty be transcended?
Robert Pastor

After conducting extensive interviews with the leaders of major political parties in Mexico and Canada in 2000, Pastor published a 207-page game plan for continental integration: *Toward A North American Community*. To create a European-like union, he recommended that North America’s leaders devise a new transportation plan, a common

immigration policy, a North American energy plan, a North American Development Fund (to reduce poverty in Mexico), a North American education plan and even a new currency, “the Amero.” Then he posed another bold question “Can sovereignty be transcended?”¹⁰

In 2002, Pastor took this provocative query directly to Canadian politicians and the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.¹¹ Its final 338-page report on integration (*Partners In North America: Advancing Canada’s Relations with the United States and Mexico*) rated Pastor as “the most explicit of our witnesses in providing suggestions for North American institution-building,” The House of Commons report cited Pastor’s work 35 times and made 39 recommendations that supported “deeper forms of trilateral partnership.”¹²

Pastor’s appeal for greater North American integration soon won admirers among business leaders and former government officials in Canada and Mexico. Mexican leaders viewed deeper integration as way to address the shortcomings of NAFTA (which did not reduce poverty or end mass migrations to the US)¹³ while Canadian academics regarded it as way to address US security preoccupations after 9/11. In 2002, Wendy Dobson, a University of Toronto economist, saluted the “Big Idea”¹⁴ and the following year the Canadian Council of Chief Executives (CCCE), which represents the chief executive officers of 150 leading corporations, jumped aboard with its own “North American Security and Prosperity Initiative.” Led by Rick George, president of Suncor Energy, a prominent oil sands company, the CCCE made 15 recommendations to harmonize regulations and strengthen “resource security” in North America. It also advocated the exploration of “a more ambitious trilateralism as advocated by Dr. Robert Pastor.”¹⁵

In 2005, Pastor gave his ideas assured political life by co-chairing the Task Force on the Future of North America, which was sponsored by the US Council on Foreign Relations. The Task Force, led by former government officials from all three countries, endorsed a radical agenda. It called for a common security perimeter by 2010, a North American border pass, a multi-service Defense Command, and a North American Resource Strategy. The Task Force concluded that “North America is blessed with an abundant resource base. Exploiting these resources on a long-term, sustainable basis requires that the three governments work together to resolve issues and ensure responsible use of scarce resources and the free flow of both resources and capital across all three borders.”¹⁶

In just four years Pastor’s vision had morphed from an academic proposal to a full-fledged continental program for economic integration affecting almost every aspect of daily life in North America.

A month later the leaders of Canada, Mexico and United States quietly announced the Security and Prosperity Partnership in Cancun, Mexico.¹⁷ In just four years Pastor’s vision had morphed from an academic proposal to a full-fledged continental program for economic integration affecting almost every aspect of daily life in North America. (For a fuller picture on the evolution of the SPP see the chronology in Appendix A.) Pastor now believes that “North Americans are ready for a new relationship that renders this old definition of sovereignty obsolete.”¹⁸ According to Pastor “the future of the world community requires integration.”¹⁹

To the SPP's many advocates its true character and mission is clear. A 2005 memo from the Canadian/American Border Trade Alliance, a broad based group dedicated to the free flow of trade goods, put it this way: "The process agreed to be undertaken is to be mostly regulatory (not to require legislation) and...the things to be done are those that make sense for business."²⁰ Given the impetus for increased North American integration, it seems only logical to ask: How long will Canadian water remain off the negotiating table?

Water: Another Trade Good?

Water not only defines Canada's geography but regularly monopolizes its political conversations. For more than four decades Canadians have debated a variety of billion-dollar schemes to export water to the United States and have rejected them as being either a threat to national security or a crazy economic venture. Whenever disputes have arisen with our American neighbors over shared waters, Canada has successfully engaged the International Boundary Waters Treaty Act of 1909 and the International Joint Commission, created under the Act to address boundary waters issues.

But the issue of water exports gained new and urgent life with the signing of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) in 1989 and NAFTA in 1993. Ever since, citizens and economists alike have asked a basic question: Is water in its natural state now a tradable good subject to liberalized trade rules?

To date no one has been able to provide a reliable answer. The facts are generally muddy. Simon Reisman, one of the key negotiators of CUFTA, NAFTA's precursor, openly supported water trading on a continental scale. His US negotiator, Clayton Yeutter, an agricultural economist, believed that "free trade is just the first step in a process leading to the creation of a single North American economy."²¹ Early drafts of CUFTA contained language that said water was not a "tradable good." But in the final version, this wording disappeared.²²

NAFTA expanded the confusion. Although this important trade pact exempted unprocessed fish and raw logs in legally binding agreements, it failed to exempt water.²³ To ease public concerns over water, the governments of Canada, Mexico and United States jointly issued a statement in 1993 saying NAFTA creates "no rights to the natural water resources" of any trading partner. But the statement was unsigned and according to some legal experts and the Canadian government's Policy Research Initiative "this statement may have no legal force."²⁴ In 2001, the federal government amended the International Boundary Waters Treaty Act (Bill C-6) to prohibit "bulk water removal" out of boundary waters because an outright ban on exports would have provoked a trade challenge. Noted trade lawyer Barry Appleton described the bill as "flawed" (it doesn't define bulk water and can be amended in secret at anytime) and warned that one provision has even "created a mechanism to actually license, in certain circumstances, water going from Canada to the United States."²⁵ At the same time the federal government encouraged the provinces to pass legislation banning bulk exports of water. But like Bill C-6, these provincial laws are either legally tenuous or allow a variety of exceptions to bulk removal of water.²⁶ Because of this "...the debate concerning bulk removal of water, including water for export, and the NAFTA continues," noted a 2001

Early drafts of CUFTA contained language that said water was not a "tradable good." But in the final version, this wording disappeared.

federal paper.²⁷ A recent and lengthy 2005 study of the federal policy on bulk water exports found that it “has not inspired and does not appear likely to inspire a unified and ongoing commitment to the prohibition of bulk water removal from the Canadian portions of major drainage basins.”²⁸ Even Senator Pat Carney, who negotiated CUFTA in the 1980s, now argues that Canadian water “is not protected” and that current policy (Bill C-6) “is not failsafe” and could be interpreted as “a bill that licenses water exports, not bans them.” She introduced a private members bill on the issue last spring.²⁹

NAFTA also posed another profound challenge to water: a clause known as Chapter 11. Under NAFTA a foreign business that believes it has been harmed by local rules (regardless of their need or justification), can sue for damages in special tribunals without the transparency afforded by normal court proceedings. (In 1998 one California company, Sun Belt Inc., filed a \$10.5-billion NAFTA claim over BC’s ban on bulk water exports; the case remains unresolved.)³⁰ More than \$13 billion worth of claims attacking environment, health and safety regulations have been filed to date and the United States has won the majority of them.³¹ It is noteworthy that Nobel prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz believes that the special rights given to investors under NAFTA “potentially weakened democracy throughout North America.”³² Communities harmed by the environmental damage by foreign firms, for example, have no recourse under NAFTA.

In a comprehensive analysis of the water export issue David Boyd, one of the nation’s leading environmental lawyers, concluded that NAFTA had greatly weakened Canada’s ability to make decisions about the future of its rivers and lakes. Given “ambiguities in the text of the agreement and the unpredictable nature of international arbitration panels,” Boyd noted that the full risks to Canadian water and water policy can’t be easily quantified.³³

A 2007 Briefing Note for Canada’s Policy Research Institute, which has done extensive work on North American economic integration since 2001, reached a similar conclusion. A commodity under NAFTA (or the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade for that matter) must be legally negotiated: “To date there has not been a ruling by a court or trade panel on whether water is a commodity and thus the legal question of whether water is a commodity cannot yet be answered with certainty.” Until a province starts to export water or a Chapter 11 challenge tests the matter under a NAFTA tribunal, “the status of water under trade agreements remains uncertain.”³⁴

This uncertainty is bound to grow now that almost every level of government in Canada has engaged in a process of trilateral continental integration with the Security and Prosperity Partnership.

Just nine months after Canada signed the SPP, Peter Lougheed, the former Premier of Alberta and a champion of free trade, warned in a *Globe and Mail* commentary that “the United States will be coming after our fresh water in three to five years.”³⁵ He argued that water scarcity would soon dominate the US agenda and that senior US politicians would ask “What about Canada? They have lots of excess water and we have the free-trade agreement. Let’s demand they share their water with us.” A month later, the US ambassador to Canada, Paul Cellucci did just that. During a CBC radio interview,

“To date there has not been a ruling by a court or trade panel on whether water is a commodity and thus the legal question of whether water is a commodity cannot yet be answered with certainty.”

Cellucci questioned why water should be “off the table” when Canada is already selling the United States its oil, gas and uranium.³⁶

The SPP Water Agenda: “A Most Sensitive Topic”

The evidence that the export of water never left the trading table is both compelling and concrete. For more than six years a variety of academic papers, think tanks, consultants and government reports have strongly advocated putting water up for sale. All support the “Big Idea” or the Security and Prosperity Partnership.

Industry Canada: In a 2001 discussion paper entitled *North American Economic Integration: Issues and Research Agenda*, Richard Harris, an economist at Simon Fraser University, specifically recommended that Canada review its water policies and “consider how water might be exported with an appropriate pricing policy.” He noted that NAFTA excluded water provided “bulk exports did not occur” but that “this situation may be untenable.” Given water shortages in the US southwest, Harris felt “the issue of water exports is almost certain to come up again.”

Brookings Institution: A 2001 book published by the prominent US think tank recommended that security, migration, labor mobility, energy and water management be subject to “formal cooperative arrangements” among the three countries. It also highlighted two annoying obstacles to deeper integration: Mexico’s inefficient state owned oil industry as well as the fact that Canadian governments “maintain some controls over the export of electricity and water.”³⁷

Council on Foreign Relations: Transcripts of a US 2001 roundtable on 9/11 and the future of North American integration spelled out what matters most to the United States: “Canada is the largest energy supplier of the United States and has 25 per cent of fresh water resources of the world.”³⁸ (For the record, Canada has only 20 percent of the world’s freshwater, and only 7 percent is a renewable resource).

C.D. Howe Institute: A 2002 paper on *Shaping the Future of the North American Economic Space* specifically addressed water while advocating the “Big Idea” of “deeper integration.” Author Wendy Dobson, a former federal deputy minister of finance, argued that increased energy trade could serve as a model for dealing “with demand pressure on other politically sensitive natural resources such as water.” She recommended that a bilateral group examine pricing options.³⁹

“Canada can ill-afford to sit on the sidelines as water becomes a traded commodity in the global marketplace.”

Paul Michael Wihbey

Global Water and Energy Strategy Team (GWEST): In January 2004, Paul Michael Wihbey, former vice president of the Liberal Party of Canada and founder of GWEST, a private Washington-DC consultancy, argued that Canada must trade water the same way it trades oil and gas. With 20 per cent of the world’s fresh water, Wihbey wrote that “Canada can ill-afford to sit on the sidelines as water becomes a traded commodity in the global marketplace.”⁴⁰

Given US and Asian demand as well as “the definition of the role of water within NAFTA and GATT accords,” Wihbey predicted that Canada “will be obligated to develop a coherent water policy and pricing strategy.” He concluded that “the growing

scarcity of water in the American West will require importing Canadian water.” Whibey’s views appeared in a publication entitled *First Commentary*, which strongly advocates for continental energy integration, and which is one of the oil patch’s most prestigious newsletters.⁴¹

Whibey later described the blanket condemnation of “profitably sharing an abundant, completely renewable resource” as a “political form of superstition.” At a 2006 Global Business Forum on water sponsored by the Alberta government (the session was entitled “Boy, is it just me, or is it getting hot and dry – where did all the water go?”) Whibey predicted that “bulk water exports will take place from Canada – Manitoba, Newfoundland, Quebec and British Columbia – in two to five years.”⁴²

Policy Research Initiative: Since the signing of the Security and Prosperity Partnership, Canada’s Policy Research Initiative (PRI), has prepared four briefing papers on NAFTA and water exports. The PRI is an arm of the federal government that researches “emerging horizontal issues.” It has also published several studies on North American regulatory cooperation and a Canada-US customs union.⁴³ Three of its four water papers concluded that the status of water under trade agreements “remains uncertain”⁴⁴, that bulk water exports to non-NAFTA countries were not “currently economically viable”⁴⁵, that small scale water exports along the border were financially viable⁴⁶, and that Canada “needs to be prepared for a potential legal challenge regarding export.”⁴⁷ (Although referenced in other reports, a fourth paper, “Exporting Canada’s Water II: To the United States or Mexico”, is not available on government websites.)⁴⁸

In May 2006, the PRI also published an article by University of Calgary professor Dixon Thompson listing six mandatory conditions for water export proposals. These were: an environmental impact assessment showing no damage to the basin, proof of exportable surplus, evidence of financial benefits to the basin; confirmation of a realistic market, a business plan, and a provision to audit the project. (Similar standards were recommended and rejected for governing water diversions out of the Great Lakes in 2004 on the grounds that they would diminish local water security.) Thompson concluded that it was entirely possible that “the United States will demand access to what it thinks of as a continental resource.”⁴⁹

Council on Foreign Relations and Canadian Council of Chief Executives: In 2004 these two groups established the Task Force on the Future of North America which then prepared the political blueprint for the SPP. Contributors included John Manley, former federal finance minister; Pedro Aspe, Mexico’s former finance minister, Wendy Dobson, University of Toronto academic and former federal associate deputy minister of finance, Thomas D’Aquino, president of the Canadian Council of Chief Executives, and Robert Pastor.⁵⁰

A summary of the 2005 Task Force Toronto Meeting called for aggressive integration. It also recommended the elimination of current exemptions of certain sectors protected under NAFTA as well as a North American resource pact “that would allow for greater intra-regional trade and investment in certain non-renewable natural resources such as oil, gas and fresh water.” The Task Force did not reach a consensus on the latter proposal. It recognized that opening “cultural industries and fresh water in Canada” or Mexico’s state owned oil industry to unfettered trade would meet with “stiff resistance.” The Task Force then advised “that policy recommendations on these issues are best considered longer-term goals.”⁵¹

The Task Force's official public report, *Building A North American Community*, made no direct mention of water. However, it did call for a full review of "sensitive sections" that had been excluded from NAFTA. An appendix offering dissenting views defines these "sensitive sections" as culture and water. Thomas Axworthy, former principal secretary to Pierre Trudeau and a professor at Queens University, robustly objected to reintroducing those sections of NAFTA that had been theoretically excluded. He argued that "a prohibition on bulk water exports should remain within national, not joint, jurisdiction."

Natural Resources Canada: A 2007 Access to Information Act request by Ottawa researcher Ken Rubin yielded several documents on "freshwater issues and the natural resource sector" that indicate "bulk water exports" are still on the table. One document, dated January 2006, stated that Canada was "not immune" to freshwater challenges and then explained why: "Ongoing issues, such as bulk water exports, high domestic water use, and climate change, suggest that we must be prepared for a non-linear future when it comes to reconciling uncertain supplies with growing demands."⁵²

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS): Early in 2007, this private US think tank, which includes trustees such as Henry Kissinger, together with the Conference Board of Canada launched the North American Future 2025 Project to assist the Security and Prosperity Partnership. (The Center, which played a critical role in NAFTA's adoption in the United States, has published several commentaries on integration including a newsletter called *The North American Integration Monitor*).⁵³ The Future 2025 Project proposed "to analyze, comprehend and anticipate North American Integration" by holding a series of closed-door roundtables on immigration, energy, security, competitiveness and water with the goal of reporting its findings to the executive and legislative branches of Canada, Mexico and the United States by the end of September, 2007.

One option included new "regional agreements between Canada, the United States and Mexico on issues such as water consumption, water transfers, artificial diversions of fresh water, water conservation technologies for agricultural irrigation and urban consumption."


However the project's 25-page agenda was leaked to the media in April 2007, just prior to a secret Calgary roundtable on the Future of the North American Environment. The document laid out plans for continental water trade in the boldest terms. "Juxtaposed to the relative scarcity of water in the United States and Mexico," the Future 2025 Project declared that Canada "had lots of water" and it shared many watersheds along the US border including the Great Lakes. "Because water availability, quality and allocation are likely to undergo profound changes between 2006 and 2025 policy makers will benefit from a more proactive approach to exploring different creative solutions beyond the current trans boundary water management agreements." One option included new "regional agreements between Canada, the United States and Mexico on issues such as water consumption, water transfers, artificial diversions of fresh water, water conservation technologies for agricultural irrigation and urban consumption." It also noted that the three governments would have to overcome bureaucratic and legal obstacles "if the overriding goal of North America is to achieve joint optimum utilization of the available water." The Future 2025 Project document makes no mention of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 between Canada and the United States or the International Joint Commission.⁵⁴

Armand Peschard-Sverdrup, a former senior consultant with Econolynx International in Ottawa, an SPP advisor since 2005, a former Mexico Director for the Center and now director of North American Future 2025 Project, later confirmed that water was obviously on the table: “It’s no secret the US is going to need water. . .It’s no secret that Canada is going to have an overabundance of water. At the end of the day there may have to be arrangements.”⁵⁵ Peschard-Sverdrup also told the Ottawa Citizen that water was “the most sensitive topic in conversations” with the Privy Council Office that advises the Prime Minister and cabinet on government priorities.⁵⁶

Water: The Growing Thirst


The water agenda of the Security and Prosperity Partnership reflects growing anxiety about water availability and quality. One in three global citizens now lack access to drinking water or basic sanitation.⁵⁷ Or as former Alberta premier Peter Lougheed puts it, “The reality is that fresh water is more valuable than crude oil.”⁵⁸

The US, in particular, faces a complicated and looming water crisis. Its population is rapidly growing in arid regions where surface water supplies have not increased or where groundwater tables are dropping “at an alarming rate.” According to the US General Accounting Office (GAO), a Congressional watchdog, 36 of 47 state water managers now expect serious shortages over the next decade under average climate conditions.⁵⁹ Half of all streams in the United States are contaminated with pesticides and fertilizers. Due to droughts and over consumption, Texas, South Dakota, Wisconsin and Tennessee are scrambling to balance available supplies with demand. In 2002 the Texas Water Development Board, for example, predicted that it could only meet 60 per cent of the state’s needs by 2050 without building new reservoirs, draining wetlands or approving controversial inter basin water transfers at a cost of nearly \$100-billion.⁶⁰




Source: National Drought Mitigation Center, University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Percent Time in Severe and Extreme Drought Nationwide, 1895 to 1995 (taken from US GAO, 2003)




Predictions of the Extent of State Shortage Likely over the Next Decade under Average Water Conditions (taken from US GAO, 2003)

Nearly half the population of the United States (or 140 million people) depends on groundwater for their domestic water supply. In 2003, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) warned that many areas of the United States are now experiencing rapid “groundwater depletion.” In Houston, Texas extensive groundwater pumping has caused local aquifers to drop by 400 feet. The Ogallala (or High Plains) aquifer, which underlies portions of eight states and provides water for 27 per cent of US irrigated land, has dropped by up to 100 feet (it has actually lost a volume of water equal to the annual flow of 18 Colorado Rivers)⁶¹. Groundwater that sustains 8 million people in the Chicago area, one of the fastest growing urban areas in the US, has dropped by up to 900 feet.⁶² Since 1988, the US Congress has appropriated \$30-billion for drought relief to little effect.⁶³



Water Level Changes in the Ogallala Aquifer, Predevelopment to 2003 (taken from US Geological Survey, High Plains Aquifer Fact Sheet, available at <http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2004/3097/>)

Water issues are particularly serious along the US/Mexico border in the Colorado and Rio Grande basins. By concentrating population and trading centers in northern Mexico, liberalized trade under NAFTA has directly led to the industrialization of desert areas.⁶⁴ The number of factories (known as maquiladoras) in the region jumped from 1,700 in 1990 to nearly 4,000 by 2001.⁶⁵ As consequence water shortages and pollution are now endemic. According to the Instituto Nacional De Ecologia, 100 of Mexico's 188 most important aquifers are now "overexploited" largely due to badly managed irrigation schemes that allow the production of food for the export trade.⁶⁶ The US Department of Commerce describes Mexico's fresh water resources as "scarce and polluted in the north". The United Nations defines Mexico "as a country under high water stress."⁶⁷



Stress on Water Resources in Mexico (taken from Statistics on Water in Mexico, 2004, Comision Nacional del Agua, available at http://www.cna.gob.mx/eCNA/Espaniol/Estadisticas/Central/Estadisticas_Agua_2004/SWM_2004.htm)

Climate change will both add and subtract water from this troubling picture in unpredictable ways. The International Panel On Climate Change (IPCC) predictions for North America's water resources are instructive. In April 2007, the IPCC warned that warmer temperatures will "constrain North America's already heavily utilized water resources, increasing competition among agricultural, municipal, industrial and ecological uses." It predicts that lower water levels in the Great Lakes and major river systems including the Columbia River will exacerbate "challenges relating to water quality, navigation, recreation, hydropower generation, water transfers and bi-national relationships."⁶⁸ (Water levels in Lake Michigan, Lake Superior and Lake Huron reached record lows in the summer of 2007.)⁶⁹ The US military recognizes climate change could destabilize water security in the western hemisphere: "There is potential for fracturing some very strong alliances based on migrations and the lack of control over borders...Military planning should view climate change as a threat to the balance of

energy access, water supplies and a healthy environment, and it should require a response,” concluded a 2007 report by 11 top ranking military officers.⁷⁰

The US has also identified the energy-water nexus as a critical challenge. It takes a lot of water to make electricity and to produce unconventional hydrocarbons (about 39 per cent of US surface water allocations go to energy production) and it takes a lot of energy to pump, treat and transport water. A 2006 report to the US Congress on “Energy Demands On Water Resources” pointed out that freshwater withdrawals already exceed rainfall in California, Florida, the High Plains and the Southwest. It also pointed out that power plants in many of these regions are forced to limit generation because of water scarcity, that current water data on consumption are inadequate, and that power plants using inefficient closed-loop cooling could use the same amount of water consumed by 50 million people by 2030. The report concluded “the US will continue to face issues related to the development, utilization and management of the critical resources of water and energy.”⁷¹

Most Canadian water experts argue that the United States and Mexico can (and should) solve their water problems with good governance, reduced trade, conservation, improved infrastructure and the use of water saving technologies. Yet when the United States lost its oil self-sufficiency several decades ago, it did not suddenly become a model conserver of fossil fuels. In 2004, US Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham noted that the US had two possible routes for a greater level of energy independence: to press for alternative fuel sources or to “shift a substantial amount of [oil] trading relationships to Canada.”⁷² Faced with growing water security issues, is it reasonable to expect that the US will act any differently?

The SPP and the Energy/Water Nexus

North American energy integration is now a fact of economic life. Few Canadians, however, appreciate how continental energy integration and the rapid development of Alberta’s oil sands are already having an impact on Canada’s water security as great or greater than foreseeable water exports.

The United States is now the world’s largest energy user. With but 5 per cent of the world’s population, the global superpower consumes 25 per cent of the world’s energy. But as SPP documents confirm, the US (unlike its trading partners Mexico and Canada) is rapidly becoming a net importer of energy. Since 1980, it has tripled its energy imports and now spends \$300 billion on oil imports every year.⁷³

Few Canadian appreciate how continental energy integration and the rapid deployment of Alberta’s oil sands are already having an impact on Canada’s water security.

Much of this energy shortfall comes from Canada. Canada now supplies the United States with 33 per cent of its total energy needs in the form of natural gas, oil and electricity.⁷⁴ Since 1999 Canada has replaced Saudi Arabia as the number one supplier of oil to the United States and now accounts for 17 per cent of US oil imports.⁷⁵ Thanks, in part, to free trade, the two countries are now linked by 22 petroleum pipelines, 34 natural gas pipelines, and 91 electric transmission lines.⁷⁶ As one US administrator recently noted, “The United States can’t get to energy independence, but North America can.”⁷⁷

Robert Pastor and other advocates of a North American Community, including Wendy Dobson, have argued repeatedly that an integrated energy market could serve as a model for deeper integration and the sharing of other resources such as water. As early as 2001 Pastor recognized that the greatest obstacle to continental integration remained Canada's and Mexico's fear of a concentrated US resource grab. Energy, he reasoned, could be the salve to ease this irritant. "If some of the poison of this issue could be extracted through a respectful, cooperative plan, it could facilitate the emergence of a North American Community."⁷⁸

The starkest links between the SPP, energy integration and the future of Canada's water resources are most evident in the oil sands. Not surprisingly, it is the world's largest capital project (\$125-billion) and the planet's second largest proven oil reserve. In 2005 the SPP's North American Energy Working Group, which works to enhance energy and streamline energy regulations, set up the Oil Sands Experts Group "to collaborate on the development of oil sands resources." (The NAEWG has a total of 10 energy study groups.)⁷⁹

In January 2006 members of the Oil Sands Experts Group including the Energy Secretary of Mexico and representatives of BP America, Shell International, Chevron and Enbridge Pipelines met in Houston, Texas to discuss the future of oil sands development. The group talked about markets, pipelines and labour issues. Given that the oil sands currently produces approximately 1-million barrels of oil a day largely for US export, the group accepted that "a fivefold expansion anticipated for the oil sands in a relatively short time span" would be a pipeline challenge.⁸⁰ (President George Bush has pledged to reduce oil imports from unstable regimes by 5 million barrels a day by 2025.)⁸¹ No mention was made of water at the meeting.⁸²



Producing oil from the tar sands takes on average three barrels of freshwater to make one barrel of oil

Unlike conventional oil, Alberta's tarry deposits are among the most water intensive hydrocarbons on the planet. Separating tar from sand not only takes enormous amounts of natural gas but requires an average of three barrels of freshwater to make just one barrel of oil.⁸³ Most of this water comes from the Athabasca River, which feeds the world's largest boreal wetland (the Peace Athabasca Delta).

Yet current production levels may already be unsustainable due to poor water planning and climate change. After studying water allocations in the region Canada's foremost water ecologist David Schindler determined that the oil sands industry now accounts for 8 per cent of all licensed water approved in Alberta.⁸⁴ That's enough freshwater (359 million cubic meters) to sustain a city of two million people.⁸⁵ Schindler also calculated that global warming has already raised local temperatures by an average of 2 degrees Celsius. As a result, summer flows on the Athabasca River declined 29% between 1971 and 2003⁸⁶ and "winter low flows have declined by an average of 1.5 metres per second

for the past 30 years.... that is equivalent to the demands of a new tar sands plant every two years.”⁸⁷


Schindler’s research demonstrates clearly that the rapid development of the tar sands and climate change are now on a collision course on the Athabasca River.⁸⁸ The outcome will not only affect the nation’s energy and water security but the livelihood of 360,000 aboriginals in the Mackenzie River Basin.

Schindler’s findings did not surprise industry. In 2005, Calgary oil consultant

Bruce Peachey estimated “water availability will soon constrain future development” in the oil sands adding that there wasn’t enough water to sustain 3 million barrels a day, let alone 5 million barrels a day. Peachey warned that government had three options: to shut down production, build upstream dams to hold spring run-off for winter months or “construct diversions to transfer water from other river basins.” In any case, he noted “considerable social conflicts” will be hard to avoid.⁸⁹

Unrestrained oil sands development (more than 60 projects have been approved since 1996) is slowly being recognized as a threat to Canadian water security. “In view of the pace of development being considered the Athabasca River could encounter serious problems unless there is a radical change in technology in terms of water use,” noted a 2007 House of Commons report on the oil sands.⁹⁰ Swedish energy analysts have asked a blunter question: “Are the Canadians willing to create an environmental disaster in Alberta in order to provide the world market with oil?”⁹¹

An Alberta government report released in February 2007 frankly admitted that Alberta Environment had failed “to provide timely advice and direction to industry relative to water use,” that its capacity to enforce environmental laws is “inadequate” and that “the Athabasca River may not have sufficient flows to meet the needs of all the planned mining operations.” Furthermore the government had failed to determine if “there is sufficient water available from the North Saskatchewan River to support” as many as seven multi-billion dollar upgraders to refine bitumen from the oil sands.⁹²



Total Summer Flow in the Athabasca River at Fort McMurray, 1971-2005 (taken from Schindler et al., 2007)

Swedish energy analysts ask “Are the Canadians willing to create an environmental disaster in Alberta in order to provide the world market with oil?”

Contaminated wastewater from open pit mines poses another serious risk to Canada’s northern water resources. Ninety per cent of the water processed at oil sand mines ends up as ketchup-thick tailings that are now stored in large impoundments bordering the Athabasca River.⁹³ (The Syncrude Tailings Dyke, for example, is the world’s second largest dam, after China’s Three Gorges Dam.) More than 10 tailings dams containing salts, heavy metals, and toxic hydrocarbons cover a 50 kilometre square area and most are leaking.⁹⁴ If collectively drained into an area the size of Lake Erie today this oil sands waste would reach a depth of 20 centimetres and by 2030 it would reach a depth of

one metre.⁹⁵ In 2003, the Mackenzie River Basin Board noted that “an accident related to the failure of one of the oil sands tailing ponds could have catastrophic impact on the aquatic ecosystem of the Mackenzie River Basin due to the size of these ponds and their proximity to the Athabasca River.”⁹⁶

The push for continental energy integration has also obscured other important truths. According to an SPP document, natural gas consumption by the oil sands could consume “as much as 60 percent of natural gas available in Western Canada in 2030.”⁹⁷ It correctly calls this trend “unsustainable”. Yet a 2007 federal document conveniently obscures the scale of this problem by reporting that the oil sands “currently represents roughly 1 per cent of total consumption in North America.”⁹⁸ In real terms the oil sands industry now consumes nearly 5 per cent of the national supply or enough gas to heat 4-million homes a day; within a decade, it could burn up 16 per cent of Canada’s annual gas supply.⁹⁹

The unsustainable gas addiction of the oil sands industry combined with US demand has accelerated the rate of shallow and unconventional gas drilling in central Alberta, from 4,000 wells in the 1996 to 20,000 wells a year in 2002.¹⁰⁰ Over time, empty oil and gas pools can fill up with water from either surface or groundwater sources. By industry estimates all of this new drilling could result in the eventual disappearance of enough water in arid Alberta (10 to 15 billion cubic meters of water) to sustain the city of Beijing (population 15 million) for three years.¹⁰¹

“An accident related to the failure of one of the oil sands tailing ponds could have catastrophic impact on the aquatic ecosystem of the Mackenzie River Basin.”

The oil sands industry also affects many other water related issues. The reclamation of thousands of kilometres squared of muskeg, fens and wetlands is in doubt.¹⁰² The megaproject is also feeding climate change, which is a major driver of global water scarcity. The Conference Board of Canada notes that as net oil and gas exports to the US climbed 180 percent from 1990 to 2003, Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions grew by 115 percent.¹⁰³ Due to the oil sands, which produce three times as much carbon dioxide as conventional oil, Canada’s growth rate for greenhouse gases has surpassed that of every Group of Eight (G8) nations in the last 14 years.¹⁰⁴ Rapid oil sands development also explains in part why Canada has failed to meet its commitments under the Kyoto Protocol and why SPP supporters have pressed for a North American climate change strategy since 2005.¹⁰⁵

Last May, the Standing Committee on International Trade heard arguments both for and against the Security and Prosperity Partnership. A broad range of organizations including the Council of Canadians made presentations. It was a series of questions about the pace and scale of energy integration, not water, that unnerved the government. When Gordon Laxer, director of the Parkland Institute, asked why Canada is “helping to ensure American energy security when Canada has no energy policy,” Committee Chair Leon Benoit intervened. He asked Laxer to connect his talk to “the study of Canada-US trade and investment issues and the Security and Prosperity Partnership.”

Laxer replied that the connection was obvious, as numerous SPP documents clearly prove. He added that Canada has no strategic petroleum reserve and no natural gas plan. At that point Benoit cut off Laxer’s presentation, stated that he was “off topic” and added that his comments “were not relevant to the subject on the agenda under the orders of the day.” Benoit then abruptly left the room.¹⁰⁶

To many, the SPP agenda for energy integration is now sacrosanct and incontestable. In 2005, Joseph Dukert, an independent US energy analyst and adjunct fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, explained that continentalization of energy “makes all three countries ever more sensitive to each other’s energy problems.” At that time trilateral cooperation in energy was so well entrenched that he suggested “it would be a counterproductive international provocation if a future government in any of the three countries tried to back out of the SPP.”¹⁰⁷

To its credit the United States has recognized that “water is an energy issue, and both water and energy are issues of national security.”¹⁰⁸ Given the record of water mismanagement in the oil sands, Canada hasn’t learned this lesson, let alone its implications for continental water integration.

Continental Water Follies: The Myths of Abundance and Wealth

The “Big Idea” that Canada can generously share its water the same way it now shares energy on a continental scale is generally based on four false assumptions: that Canada has lots of “surplus” water; that Canada has no water problems; that Canada maintains excellent water data and that Canada can get fabulously rich selling its water. These myths are debunked below.

Canada has an average supply of water for its size

The media often repeats the myth that Canada has a quarter to half of the world’s water resources. This statement is grossly inaccurate. First, it fails to distinguish the difference between ecological capital (the amount of water Canada inherited from ancient glaciers that is non-renewable) and ecological interest (the amount of water annually replaced by rainfall that is available for use.) Ninety-nine percent of the water in the Great Lakes, for example, is a glacial inheritance and a non-renewable resource.¹⁰⁹

Second, economists tend to reduce water needs to per capita availability and forget that fish, trees and ducks drink water too. Given that Canada has 7 percent of the world’s land mass, Canada has but a fair share of renewable global water supplies: 7 per cent. That’s slightly more the United States with 6.5 percent. (In contrast, Mexico has 1 percent of the world’s supply.) Russia and Brazil have nearly twice as much renewable water as Canada. By global standards then, Canada has an average supply of freshwater and no surplus.¹¹⁰

General A.G.L. McNaughton, who co-chaired the International Joint Commission in the 1950s expressed it best: “It is nonsense to talk about a surplus and its dangerous folly to even contemplate selling water. All our water resources can be translated into growth somewhere. Let that growth take place here in Canada.”¹¹¹

By global standards, Canada has an average supply of freshwater and no surplus.

In addition more than half of Canada’s water, flows north into semi-arid Arctic regions and is inaccessible. Water resources along the US border, where most Canadians live, accounts for only 2.6 per cent of world’s renewable supply. Many of these rivers and lakes are now over allocated and in some cases are grossly polluted.¹¹²

Canada has mismanaged its water capital

Canadians may revere their water resources as national icons, yet in reality their governments (and arguably the Canadians who elected them) have actively abused them. Due to sustained federal, municipal and provincial neglect Lake Winnipeg and the St Lawrence River are on the verge of ecological collapse from agricultural pollution and climate change.¹¹³ Blue-green algae blooms erupted on one quarter of Quebec's lakes in 2007 due to pollution.¹¹⁴ Drought, population growth and disappearing glaciers have reduced summer flows in many western rivers by 40 per cent to 70 per cent.¹¹⁵ In 1999 one in four Canadian municipalities reported having experienced water shortages in the last five years.¹¹⁶

Canadian enforcement of water laws has become a source of international embarrassment. In 2000, the Ontario Ministry of Environment recorded 1,900 water pollution violations by 200 corporations yet it laid only four charges. Environment Canada noted 3,000 documented violations of federal laws by pulp mills but only proceeded with seven prosecutions.¹¹⁷ An exhaustive 390 page investigation by the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (an agency under NAFTA) found that Environment Canada repeatedly failed to enforce the pollution prevention provisions of the Fisheries Act and the provisions of the Pulp and Paper Effluent Regulations against 10 pulp and paper mills in Quebec, Ontario and the Atlantic Provinces.¹¹⁸ "If there is a chasm between environmental laws and their enforcement in the United States, then in Canada there is a Grand Canyon," wrote David Boyd recently.¹¹⁹

Canadian enforcement of water laws has become an international embarrassment.

Canada has kept poor records on its water bank and has no water policy

Canada hasn't had a coherent water policy since the 1987 Federal Water Policy, which actually banned water exports, but was tabled and then abandoned. Due to financial cutbacks to Environment Canada's water program, the department failed to release national estimates of water use for 2001, breaking a five-year reporting cycle established in 1971.¹²⁰ Funding for federal and provincial water research, once a source of national pride, has declined so dramatically in the last 30 years, that water ecologist David Schindler told the Canadian Senate in 2005 "no one is minding the store."¹²¹

Government documents acquired under the *Freedom of Information Act* by Ottawa researcher Ken Rubin and dated January 2006 confirm that Canada maintains poor water records and has an incoherent policy. Although Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) documents reveal that "Canadians are currently facing serious groundwater quality and availability issues...There is no visible federal water policy agenda nor a common agenda for the whole country."¹²² These classified documents also confirm that "the absence of a common strategic federal vision for freshwater" is a "limiting factor for ensuring the long-term sustainable development of the resource."¹²³

"Canadians are currently facing serious groundwater quality and availability issues...There is no visible federal water policy agenda nor a common agenda for the whole country."

Nearly a third of all Canadians (10 million people) depend on groundwater as their primary source of drinking water. Yet only three of eight key regional aquifers have been mapped.¹²⁴ Canada does not even know to what degree aquifers in Saskatchewan are connected to the depleted Ogallala Aquifer.¹²⁵ One NRCan memo

notes that “the current state of knowledge of the resource is inversely proportional to its importance.” NRCan now estimates that only eleven of the 30 key aquifers will be assessed for “volume, vulnerability and sustainability by 2010.” At this current rate of progress it will take another 28 years to develop a basic National Inventory of groundwater resources.¹²⁶ Such data poverty raises a basic question: how can Canada even contemplate sharing water resources on a continental scale when the federal government doesn’t even know what’s in the national water bank account?

Canada won’t get rich exporting water

Exporting water is a money losing game for the simple reason that it would subtract from existing economic and ecological services that are provided by freshwater. “Canada’s freshwater resources are less available than we think,” according to Gilles Rheaume, vice president of policy for the Conference Board of Canada.¹²⁷

Canada’s trade economy is deeply dependent on the quality and quantity of its water. Almost every Canadian product exported abroad (cattle, grain, hogs, automobiles, aluminum, electricity, wood or oil), contains enormous volumes of embedded water or what economists call “virtual water”. Canada now exports more virtual water than either India or China in its trade goods.¹²⁸ (About 15 per cent of the water used in the world is exported in virtual form, largely because of cheap oil.) In addition, two out of every three litres of the nation’s freshwater withdrawals are used for the generation of electric power, an economic venture that is already threatened by climate change.¹²⁹

Given the current volume of Canada’s virtual water exports ($272.5 \times 10^9 \text{ m}^3$), exports of real water can only adversely affect the economy. University of Western Ontario engineer, Slobodan Simonovic calculated that “water export” from the St. Lawrence River Basin, for example, would reduce “the available water for consumption by different water use sectors.”¹³⁰ Exporting water simply means less water at home to create jobs and less water to sustain ecological services provided by rivers and lakes necessary for life.

Peter Gleick, one of the world’s foremost experts on water issues, recently noted that “water availability and quality will be increasingly an significant driver of national/regional competitive growth in coming years.”¹³¹ Nations and regions that allow water exports would be losing this critical advantage.

The issue of royalties or public rent from water sales also demands attention. A 2005 analysis by the federal government concluded that Canada wouldn’t get rich trading water. Because of the high cost of transporting bulk water by supertanker, water royalties would “have to be small”. The number of jobs created would be minimal and would be largely confined to the maintenance of ships or pipelines.¹³²

Water, in other words, could become another cheap raw resource give-away much like oil. No one would argue that oil exports are not a profitable venture for Canada. But so far the benefits have largely accrued from investment activity in the oil sands as opposed to direct royalties from the resource, bitumen. Unless it is upgraded, bitumen has half the value of conventional oil. By industry standards, Alberta and Canada have priced the oil sands resource at 13 percent of global norms.¹³³ The US General Accounting Office recently noted that

Exporting water simply means less water at home to create jobs and less water to sustain ecological services provided by rivers and lakes necessary for life.

Canada's oil royalties in the oil sands are lower than those in Alaska or Louisiana.¹³⁴ Last year Murray Smith, Alberta's representative to the United States, told a high profile oil patch audience "the royalty structure for oil sands is we 'give it away' at a one percent royalty structure."¹³⁵ Roland Priddle, former chair of the National Energy Board, promoted this "give it away" approach to finite resources at a Texas energy gathering sponsored by the Canadian Consulate General last year: "Where else can you purchase in place oil (well, bitumen) for one cent a barrel?"¹³⁶

Bulk Water is Moving

Many Canadian water experts have long argued that exporting water will never happen because it's too costly. But increasing global water scarcity and new technologies challenge that optimistic view.

In 2006, two economists at Dalhousie University looked at the business of exporting water, a subject often neglected by water export critics. They calculated that water from the Annapolis River in Nova Scotia could easily find a market in thirsty Brownsville, Texas. Such a trade, using ocean tankers, would require nearly \$90 million in infrastructure. As such it would be unprofitable.

However, exporting the same water using floating polyurethane bags would cost an eighth of the tanker scheme. The floating bag alternative would in fact be comparable to the costs of constructing a desalination plant in Texas. In other words, concluded the economists, moving Canadian water by bags across the ocean "could become more attractive and may actually be undertaken." Accordingly bulk water exports might soon "stop being a game of symbols and law" and "begin to get serious."¹

Transporting water out of basin is already a serious global practice that relies less and less on supertankers. Last year Israel and Turkey signed the Manavgat Peace Water agreement to transport oil, natural gas, electricity and water via four underwater pipelines.² (A previous plan to move water by supertanker was abandoned for financial reasons). The United States is currently building a \$400 million 337-mile long pipeline to distribute water from the Missouri River to water short citizens in South Dakota, Iowa and Minnesota.³ Spain and South Africa are both exploring or building long-distance water export projects.⁴ In 2002, China began work on a gigantic south to north water diversion scheme that involves three canals running 1,300 kilometres across the country linking four rivers at a cost of \$60 billion.⁵

¹ Fraha E; Ayoubi and James McNiven, Political, Environmental and Business Aspects of Bulk Water Exports: A Canadian Perspective, Canadian Journal of Administrative Science, March 2006, p 24.

² Etgar Lefkovits, Israel and Turkey Plan Energy Pipeline, Jerusalem Post, May 11, 2006. See also <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=31001>

³ <http://www.lcrws.org/plan.asp>

⁴ Credit Suisse, Water, Global Equity Research: Credit Suisse, June 7, 2007, p 49. See also Chanel Pringle, Engineering Company advances South African water projects, Creamer Media's Engineering News, July 20, 2007.

⁵ <http://www.chinapage.com/water/resource.html>

Environmental Trade-offs

How nations treat their water resources is intimately tied to how they use their landscapes. A nation's environmental performance cannot be separated from its water record. In 1993, a document by Canada's Parliamentary Research Branch promised that the economic benefits of NAFTA would "enhance a country's ability to protect and upgrade its environment."¹³⁷ William Reilly, then head of the US Environmental Protection Agency, also proclaimed that NAFTA would usher in a new era of "economic and environmental progress".

The Security and Prosperity Partnership is now making less modest claims with a hastily assembled agenda. Trilateral government officials are now discussing how to reduce ship air pollution, identify alien species, and improve air quality.¹³⁸ The public record shows that in the absence of strengthened environmental regulations, trade liberalization in North America has progressively degraded Canadian and Mexican environments and diminished natural capital essential for economic health.


The essential truth is this: "In all four studies Canada's environmental performance is unsatisfactory."

Statistics from the Mexican government including the Mexican National System of Economic and Environmental Accounts show that, with the exception of deforestation, pollution of land, water and air have worsened under NAFTA by 31.5 per cent, 16 per cent and 18.3 per cent respectively.¹³⁹ Despite increased economic activity, real spending on environmental protection declined in Mexico by 45 per cent during the first decade of the agreement. Although Mexico did not become a pollution haven, as may NAFTA critics feared, the financial costs of environmental degradation due to trade liberalization amounted to 10 per cent of the GDP or an average of \$36-billion a year.¹⁴⁰ Concluded Kevin Gallagher at Tufts University: "Without environmental laws, regulations, and the willingness and capacity to enforce them, trade-led growth will lead to increases in environmental degradation."¹⁴¹

Canada's environmental record and reputation has fared just as poorly. In 2005 the David Suzuki Foundation compared Canada's environment performance with other members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) between the years 1992 and 2002. Canada ranked 28th out of 30 countries on key indicators such as water and energy consumption and ranked last on nuclear waste. Canada also performed below average in its rate of improvement. The report partly attributed Canada's weak overall standing to "poor public policy." Other recent studies by the Conference Board and Yale University ranked Canada in the lower middle of the group while a 2001 study by David Boyd ranked Canada at the very bottom. The essential truth is this: "In all four studies Canada's environmental performance is unsatisfactory."¹⁴²

Water: A Matter of National Responsibility

In 2003, Peter Gleick, the president of the non-partisan Pacific Institute based in Berkeley, California, wrote a letter to President George W. Bush, noting that water was the issue of the day and that the United States had failed to effectively address its national water problems let alone provide global leadership.¹⁴³ (The same letter could easily have been sent to the leaders of Canada and Mexico.) Gleick explained to President Bush that most water problems required smart local action as well as strong federal leadership.



Water Shortages and Population Growth: Freshwater withdrawals already exceed precipitation in many parts of the US (taken from US Department of Energy, Report to Congress on the Interdependence of Energy and Water, December 2006)

Given the magnitude of the coming water crisis in the US, Gleick urged the president to create a new National Water Commission. The Commission would undertake a few specific jobs. First, it would set national objectives for science and data collection. Next it would revise or better enforce water laws. Then it would tackle the management of groundwater resources and prepare for the growing and severe threats posed by climate change. Last but not least, it would reduce the risk of international tensions over shared water resources in Mexico and Canada.

Gleick's prescription is an ecological recipe for security and prosperity for Canada, Mexico and the United States. Nations that take care of their water, take care of their economies. Rather than imagining a loss of sovereignty or the creation of trilateral bodies that produce reports in three languages, Gleick invited the United States to responsibly exercise stewardship over water within its borders and to live within its means. As a friend, Canada should ask for no more and no less.

Gleick's prescription remains a novel, conservative and democratic idea for all three nations.

Ten Questions

Given the potential implications of increased North American integration, ordinary citizens might well ask their politicians ten central questions:

- 1.) Why is the Security and Prosperity Partnership and its implications for water not subject to legislative approval and public debate in legislatures governed by elected representatives of citizens?
- 2.) What happens to the concept of “no taxation without representation” if key decisions about energy, immigration and water are being made by trilateral groups?
- 3.) Why are some of Canadian business leaders and academics talking about economic integration instead of asking Canadians how to define a distinct relationship with the United States and Mexico that protects Canada’s own best interests, including its water resources?
- 4.) Has Canada quietly surrendered its right to develop either a national water or energy strategy in order to accommodate the SPP and US energy needs?
- 5.) Why should a nation without a water policy share its water with a superpower with a well defined water crisis and a crushing \$500 billion deficit that the US General Accounting Office calls “daunting”?
- 6.) Why would Canada want to liquidate its hydrocarbons and imperil its western water resources to supply unconstrained US demand for oil when orderly development is in the public interest?
- 7.) Why would Canada want to “continentalize” its water resources, when climate change, scientific gaps and industrial pollution already threaten Canada’s water security?
- 8.) How does becoming part of a larger marketplace protect Canada’s water, solve the energy crisis or act on climate change?
- 9.) What country, 32 million in size, has improved it’s the future prospects for water by integrating with a super power of 300 million?
- 10.) If trade liberalization has accelerated the depletion of water supplies in the southwest border region between Mexico and the US, and energy integration has grossly compromised Alberta’s water future, how can an acceleration of trade solve these problems?

Moving Forward

The SPP has established a continental agenda for political integration that is slowly changing the lives of every Canadian. The SPP, largely driven by the interests and needs of its dominant player, the United States, has already embarked on an ambitious agenda to integrate the continent's customs, transportation and security networks. In the absence of domestic Canadian policy the SPP has also accelerated energy integration and undermined national action on climate change, for the benefit of the dominant trade partner. To date successive Canadian governments have actively sacrificed water resources in the name of rapid oil sands development and North American energy integration.

Many SPP documents assume that a continental water policy is just as desirable as a continental energy policy, which is now a fait accompli. This explicit assumption raises two questions.

- Has the move towards a continental energy policy jeopardized our own energy security?
- And can continental water policy, including bulk water exports, be far behind?

Water and energy are inexorably linked on the continent. Yet these critical resources share important differences. Over the years a majority of Canadian voters have uniformly expressed hostility to water export schemes. The reasons, explains Frank Quinn, one of Canada's leading experts on the issue, are self-evident: "Water is an economic good, but it is so much more than that: it is the basis of all life, not just human. It is integral to the health and beauty of Canada's landscape. It is the key to our past and future. If this, the last and greatest natural resource still in Canadian hands is traded away, we are a lesser people, sovereign in name only."¹⁴⁴

"We should not export our freshwater – we need it and we should conserve it. And we should communicate to the United States very quickly how firm we are about it."

Peter Lougheed

In response to public pressure, in 1999 the federal government and its provincial partners adopted what on paper is a credible public position on water exports. The federal government recognized the need to keep water within Canada's five natural drainage basins for a number of reasons: to sustain natural flows, to prevent the transport of invasive pests and diseases, to protect biological diversity, and to ensure sustainable use of water for future generations. But concrete action has been limited to the 2002 prohibition on the bulk removal of water from boundary water basins, and provincial legislative bans that probably will not stand up to court challenges.

At the same time the federal government was prohibiting the bulk removal of water from boundary water basins, it was pursuing a private water agenda. It has rarely condemned water export proposals and has actively investigated the possibilities of pricing water for export. The federal government has also failed to clarify the status of water in its natural state under two free trade agreements. As a consequence, water's status under liberalized trade, let alone the Security and Prosperity Partnership, remains "uncertain."

In 2005 former Alberta Premier Peter Lougheed was quoted in Canada's national newspaper as saying that "We should not export our freshwater – we need it and we

should conserve it. And we should communicate to the United States very quickly how firm we are about it.”¹⁴⁵ Political scientist Michael Byers expressed this sentiment more bluntly this year: “Unless we stand up for our own interests, Canadian freshwater could soon be irrigating crops, watering golf courses and filling backyard swimming pools in the southwestern United States. It is time to dissuade Americans of the notion that we’re going to rescue them from the consequences of their short-sighted, profligate ways by allowing them to mess with our environment, too.”¹⁴⁶

This need not be a confrontational issue. Whenever consulted on the question of inter basin diversions both US and Canadian citizens routinely arrive at the same conclusion: over the long term, everyone is better off living within their own water budget, which means keeping water in its natural drainage basin. Local water governance, when done well, protects living rivers and lakes. In 2005, 30 million American and 10 million Canadian inhabitants of the Great Lakes Basin joined together and successfully convinced their state and provincial governments to prohibit removals of water from the Great Lakes Basin with minor and well-defined exceptions.

Reaching an appropriate accommodation with our largest trading partner and abiding friend, will take bold changes in Canadian policy and leadership. We will need to renew the nation’s commitment to water research. We will need to demand transparent debate about water management proposals. We will need institutions and individuals who can bargain effectively with an aggressive neighbour. We will need to work with the American people and their political leaders to show that their own long-term water security is best served by national and local solutions. And we will have to lead by example by managing our waters as though they mattered for future generations of Canadians as well as for the fish that live in them. But at this critical juncture on the debate on deeper North American integration, our water capabilities and policies resemble a rudderless boat.

The issues raised by rapid continental economic integration are complex and cannot be resolved in this paper. But if Canadian water policy is going to be defined in Canada, by Canadians, and for Canadians, four specific proposals must be considered:

- 1. The SPP process should be opened to full public scrutiny and democratic debate as recommended by the federal government in 2003.**¹⁴⁷
- 2. The federal government should immediately assess and annually report on the full impact of the continental integration of oil, gas and electricity on the nation’s water resources (a form of virtual water export).**
- 3. The Canadian government should immediately inform the governments of the United States and Mexico that bulk water removals from Canada’s major drainage basins will not be permitted and that the topic of water export will be excluded from all future SPP or related discussions.**
- 4. Finally, the Canadian government should pass federal legislation obliging it to step in and prevent the bulk removal of water from any of Canada’s five major drainage basins in the event that any province is either unable or unwilling to do so.**

Appendix A

Energy and Water Integration: A Partial SPP Chronology

January 1994: After heated debate in three countries the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) comes into effect and eventually makes North America the largest trading zone on the planet. Mexico excludes energy from the deal while Canada “technically” excludes bulk water exports.

October 1994: Sidney Weintraub, a leading political economist with the Washington DC think tank the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, argues that NAFTA “must deepen if it is to survive” in his book, *NAFTA What Comes Next?* He notes “Deepening, if it happens, will require some diminution of national sovereignty.”¹⁴⁸

January 1999: A book by continental scholars on the impact of NAFTA (*North American Economic Integration*) concludes that continental “integration is a road with many turns, many red and amber lights, but few signs indicating the appropriate direction.”¹⁴⁹

February 2001: Vicente Fox, president of Mexico, on the advice of his foreign minister Jorge Castaneda, proposes “unfettering the economic potential of every citizen” by striving to “consolidate a North American economic community.” George Bush and Jean Chretien promise to study the ideas of deeper economic integration including free movement of labor, a development fund for Mexico and enhanced energy cooperation.¹⁵⁰

April 2001: Seven years after NAFTA, a report prepared for Industry Canada (*North American Economic Integration: Issues and Research Agenda*) concludes the benefits of deeper integration will largely be economic and the costs include “a loss of sovereignty.” Given growing water supply problems in the United States the report recommends that Canada review its bulk water export policies and “consider how water might be exported with an appropriate pricing policy.”¹⁵¹

June 2001: The energy ministers of Canada, Mexico and the United States form the North American Energy Working Group (NAEWG) at a cabinet/ministerial level “to enhance North American energy trade and interconnections consistent with the goal of sustainable development.” Canada is now the number one supplier of oil to the United States. The NAEWG prefigures SPP working groups by four years.¹⁵²

September 2001: Robert Pastor, a prominent US academic, publishes *Toward A North American Community*. The book advocates that Mexico, Canada and United States move forward on economic integration “with small steps”. He proposes trilateral institutions governing immigration, energy, regional development, education and a common currency, “the Amero.”¹⁵³

September 11, 2001: The terrorist attack on the Twin Towers closes both Canadian and Mexican borders, severely disrupts trade and provokes a crisis among business leaders favoring deeper economic integration.

October 17, 2001: In Washington D.C., the Council on Foreign Relations convenes a meeting on “The Future of North American Integration In the Wake of the Terrorist Attacks.” Transcripts of the trilateral talks call for deeper integration in trade, security, immigration and “harmonization of policies.” The meeting notes that Canada is the largest energy supplier to the US and “has 25% of the fresh water resources of the world.” Robert Pastor proposes a North American Commission to help leaders “think about issues from a continental standpoint.”¹⁵⁴

December 2001: Eight organizations from Mexico, Canada and the United States form a project on the future of North American Integration: Brookings Institution; Inter-American Dialogue; Mexican Council on Foreign Relations; National Policy Association; Policy Research Initiative of the Canadian Government; the Conference Board of Canada; Public Policy Forum of Canada, and Technological Institute of Mexico.¹⁵⁵

January 2002: A cost benefit analysis on NAFTA by the Canadian-American Centre advocates for further integration but admits such a process “may also require further erosion of national sovereignty in Canada and Mexico that will be resisted by many groups and citizens.”¹⁵⁶

January 2002: A book published by the Brookings Institution, *The Future of North American Integration: Beyond NAFTA*, proposes that deeper integration should include accords on “migration, energy and water management, transportation and infrastructure, security arrangements, and foreign policy consultations.” Robert Pastor contributes.¹⁵⁷

April 2002: A commentary for the C.D. Howe Institute by Wendy Dobson proposes deeper integration with the United States and calls trilateral economic integration the “Big Idea”. She also recommends the formation of a bilateral working group to examine pricing options for “politically sensitive natural resources such as water.”¹⁵⁸

November 2002: A report for the Trilateral Commission by University of Toronto professor Wendy Dobson, a former federal deputy minister of finance, argues that a prosperous North American economy will need a continental framework linking the following issues: “security, natural resources, economic efficiency and defense.”¹⁵⁹

December 2002: A House of Commons report (*Partners In North America*) makes 39 recommendations for increasing North American economic integration. One dissenting opinion adds that “there are very real concerns that Canada’s energy sovereignty and our ability to prevent bulk water exports are jeopardized by NAFTA.” The report cites Robert Pastor’s ideas 35 times.¹⁶⁰

January 2003: The Canadian Council of Chief Executives (CCCE), which represents the interests of 150 of Canada’s top corporations, launches the North American Security and Prosperity Initiative (NASPI) to “accelerate progress on both economic and security issues” including open markets for natural resources.¹⁶¹

March 2003: Robert Pastor joins the board of directors for a new trilingual Montreal-based organization called the “North American Forum on Integration.” Its mission: “address the issues raised by North American integration as well as identify new ideas and strategies to reinforce the North American region.”¹⁶²

January 2004: Paul Michael Wihbey, former president of the Liberal Party of Canada, argues that “Canada can ill-afford to sit on the sidelines as water becomes a traded commodity in the global marketplace.” The emerging water commodities market could be an attractive “means of business growth and diversification” for Canada’s oil industry.¹⁶³

April 2004: The Canadian Council of Chief Executives publishes *New Frontiers: Building a 21st Century Canada-United States Partnership In North America*. It endorses the reduction of “regulatory obstacles” and proposes “a resource security pact based on respect for the twin principles of security of access and security of supply.”¹⁶⁴

April 1, 2004: Robert Pastor chairs a trilateral meeting in Monterrey, Mexico on *Forging North American Energy Security*. The theme: “NAFTA partners should be North American energy partners.”¹⁶⁵

May 2004: The North American International Trade Corridor Partnership holds a summit on “North American Convergence” and Robert Pastor recommends that Canada contribute \$10-billion a year to fund Mexican infrastructure. He also promotes a North American Commission and North American passport.¹⁶⁶

October 2004: The US Council on Foreign Relations launches the Task Force on the Future of North America to examine “regional integration” after NAFTA. Participants include Thomas D’Aquino, Chief Executive of the Canadian Council of Chief Executives (CCCE) John Manley, former minister of finance; Pedro Aspe, former finance minister of Mexico and Robert Pastor.¹⁶⁷

February 2005: A summary of meeting notes from the Toronto Meeting of the Task Force on the Future of North America endorses a “bold vision for regional integration.” It also highlights the importance of forging a “resource pact” to allow for greater interregional trade in certain nonrenewable resources such as “oil, gas and fresh water.”¹⁶⁸

March 14, 2005: The Task Force on the Future of North America releases an interim report prior to the first Security and Prosperity Partnership summit. A Council on Foreign Relations press release recommends harmonized regulations, seamless trade, a joint energy and resource strategy including “a North American alternative to the Kyoto Protocol.”¹⁶⁹

March 23, 2005: The leaders of Canada, Mexico and the United States, Paul Martin, Vicente Fox and George Bush, establish the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) to advance economic integration. The SPP essentially adopts a less ambitious version of integration proposed by the Task Force On the Future of North America co-chaired by Robert Pastor.¹⁷⁰ The North American Energy Working Group becomes part of the SPP and creates working groups investigating nuclear energy and the oil sands.¹⁷¹

May 2005: The Council on Foreign Relations and the Canadian Council of Chief Executives publishes the Task Force on the Future of North America’s final recommendations, *Building A North American Community*. The report recommends a North American resource accord “that recognizes the balance between security of supply and security of access” and calls for a full review of issues excluded from NAFTA including bulk water exports.¹⁷²

September 2005: Robert Pastor holds a trilateral seminar on the SPP with guests that include Kevin Lynch, former Canadian Deputy Minister of Finance (now Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet) and Susan Harper, Head of the Economic and Trade Policy Section of the Embassy of Canada.¹⁷³

October 2005: The North American Forum, a “sister organization” to the SPP, meets secretly in Sonoma, California to explore steps “that can be taken to advance security, prosperity and quality of life on the continent.” Attendees include John Manley, Peter Lougheed, Pedro Aspe and George Shultz.¹⁷⁴

October 2005: The Council of the Americas, a US counterpart to the CCCE, reports in *Energy in the Americas: Building a Lasting Partnership for Security and Prosperity* that “greater integration requires the standardization of regional and sub-regional laws, taxes, royalties, and transmission rates”.

November 2005: Peter Lougheed, former Premier of Alberta and a co-chair of the North American Forum, predicts “that the United States will be coming after our fresh water aggressively in three to five years. We must prepare to ensure that we aren’t trapped in an ill advised response.”¹⁷⁵

December 2005: US ambassador Paul Cellucci admits that water is going to be “ a very valuable commodity” and asks why “water is off the table” when Canada is already selling the United States oil, gas and uranium.¹⁷⁶

January 2006: An SPP meeting of 50 government officials and business leaders from Canada, Mexico and United States concludes that “in the absence of statutory or regulatory limitations on its scope, the SPP has the ability to expand into many different areas beyond those identified in the initial stages of the process.” The group proposes a North American Competitiveness Council to advise the SPP.¹⁷⁷

March 2006: George Bush, Vincente Fox and Stephen Harper meet in Cancun to review the progress of the SPP and endorse the idea of a North American Competitiveness Council to provide “high-level, strategic, medium to long-term advice” on integration.¹⁷⁸

June 2006: US Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez and his Mexican and Canadian counterparts formally create the North American Competitiveness Council with a focus on “regulatory convergence” and “energy integration”: the NACC is composed of ten corporate leaders from each country.¹⁷⁹

June 28, 2006: A Natural Gas Workshop report for the Security and Prosperity Partnership warns that the US is facing “a continuous decline of natural gas,” and that “environmental regulation” is causing pipeline construction delays in North America. It is important “to support Canada’s export volumes.”¹⁸⁰

July 2006: The Washington DC think tank, Centre for Strategic and International Studies agrees to convene six secret roundtables (North American Future 2025 Project) on key SPP issues including labor mobility, energy, water and security in order to strengthen the capacity of officials to “analyze, comprehend and anticipate North American integration.” The Centre highlights water scarcity as critical issue for the United States and Mexico and calls for “joint optimum utilization of the available water.”

September 2006: The North American Forum, a group of former government officials and business leaders that advises the SPP process, meets in Banff to secretly discuss energy integration and security issues. Robert Pastor and Wendy Dobson attend. ¹⁸¹

January 2007: A Briefing Note for Canada's Policy Research Initiative concludes that until the status of water under existing trade agreements "is tested in a court or tribunal" its future remains "uncertain." Canada "needs to be prepared for a potential legal challenge regarding export."¹⁸²

April 2007: The Centre for Strategic and International Studies and the Conference Board of Canada convenes a round table on "The Future of the North American Environment 2025." The agenda includes "regional agreements between Canada, the United States and Mexico on issues such as water consumption, water transfers, artificial diversions of fresh water..."¹⁸³

May 2007: Conservative MPs walk out of a hearing on the SPP by the House of Commons Standing Committee On International Trade after presenter Gordon Laxer links the SPP to rapid tar sands production and the lack of a national energy strategy. ¹⁸⁴

August 2007: Stephen Harper, George Bush and Felipe Calderon meet in Montebello, Quebec for the third SPP summit.

September 2007: The Centre for Strategic and International Studies North American Future 2025 project will table its recommendations on North American integration regarding, labor, energy, water and security to the governments of Mexico, Canada and the United States.

Compiled by Andrew Nikiforuk

ENDNOTES

-
- ¹ <http://veracity.univpubs.american.edu/weekly/webnews/052907triumvirate.html>
 - ² The TrilatHerald, Vol.3 No.2/3, May 22/24, 2007
 - ³ The TrilatHerald, Vol 3, No.4, May 24, 2007
 - ⁴ The TrilatHerald, May 22, 2007 : <http://www.fina-nafi.org/eng/fina/presentation.asp?langue=eng&menu=finahtt>
 - ⁵ Canadian Council of Chief Executives, Trilateral Security and Prosperity Partnership Will Boost Jobs and Investment, Say Canada's CEOs, March 23, 2005
 - ⁶ <http://www.pi.energy.gov/documents/NAEWGindex020306.pdf>
 - ⁷ Renata D'Aliesio, North American climate change pact urges, CanWest News Service, July 2, 2007
 - ⁸ Partners in North America: Advancing Canada's Relations with the United States and Mexico: Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, December 2002: p.158
 - ⁹ Robert Pastor, Toward A North American Community, Institute for International Economics, August 2001, pp.1-3
 - ¹⁰ Ibid, p.147
 - ¹¹ <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/cmte/CommitteePublication.aspx?COM=3272&SourceId=37592&SwitchLanguage=1>
 - ¹² A 2003 government response to the House of Commons report endorsed the recommendations but added, "We require a consensus on directions to be taken before we commit ourselves to the establishment of new trilateral institutions or programs." <http://www.international.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/GovtResponse-en.pdf>
 - ¹³ Joseph Stiglitz, The Broken Promise of NAFTA, New York Times, January 6, 2004 <http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/econ/2004/0106stiglitznafta.htm>
 - ¹⁴ Wendy Dobson, Shaping the Future of the North American Economic Space: A Framework For Action, C.D. Howe Institute, April 2002, 20
 - ¹⁵ CCCE, Security and Prosperity: Toward A New Canada-United States Partnership In North America, January 2003. For quote on Pastor see later document: Canadian Council of Chief Executives, New Frontiers: Building A 21st Century Canada-United States Partnership In North America, April 2004, 27 (http://www.ceocouncil.ca/en/view/?document_id=365)
 - ¹⁶ Council on Foreign Relations, Building A North American Community: Report of an Independent Task Force, 2005, 16
 - ¹⁷ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050323-4.html>
 - ¹⁸ <http://www.cisan.unam.mx/Norteamerical/hm/rpastor5.html>
 - ¹⁹ Sally Acharya, Model North American Parliament Draws Students from Three Nations, American Weekly, May 29, 2007
 - ²⁰ http://www.canambta.org/SPP_NORTH_AMERICA.pdf
 - ²¹ For Yeutter quote see John Foster and John Dillon, NAFTA in Canada: The Era of a Supra-Constitution, Public Policy Forum, The New Dynamics of North America: U.S.-Mexico Relations and the Border Economy, Ottawa, May, 2002.
 - ²² Michael Byers, Intent for a Nation, Douglas & McIntyre, Vancouver, 2007, p.203
 - ²³ David Boyd, Unnatural Law, UBC Press, 2003, pp 67-55
 - ²⁴ Policy Research Initiative, Sustainable Development Briefing Note: Is Water A Tradable Commodity? January, 2007 p.3 http://policyresearch.gc.ca/doclib/SD_BN_Water%20Tradable_e.pdf
 - ²⁵ http://www.patcarney.ca/Speech%20_Bills-225.pdf
 - ²⁶ Bulk Water Removals: Canadian Legislation <http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0213-e.htm#endnotes>
 - ²⁷ <http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/prb0041-e.htm>

-
- ²⁸ Josha Maria Alexandra McNab, An Assessment of the Effectiveness of Canada's Bulk Water Export Policy using British Columbia as a Case Study, Master's Thesis, Simon Fraser University, Spring 2005, 127
- ²⁹ <http://www.patcarney.ca/priorities.html#>
- ³⁰ Boyd, Unnatural Law, 56
- ³¹ Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, NAFTA Chapter 11-State Disputes, March 2007 http://policyalternatives.ca/documents/National_Office_Pubs/2007/NAFTA_Dispute_Table_March2007.pdf
- ³² Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Broken Promise of NAFTA, New York Times, January 6, 2004
- ³³ David Boyd, Unnatural Law, p.63
- ³⁴ PRI, "Is Water A Tradable Commodity?" pp. 3-4
- ³⁵ Peter Lougheed, "It's Not the Crude," Globe and Mail, November 11, 2005
- ³⁶ Byers, Intent for A Nation, 202
- ³⁷ Peter Hakim and Robert Litan, The Future of North American Integration: Beyond NAFTA, Brookings Institution Press, 2002
http://www.brook.edu/press/books/chapter_1/futureofnorthamericanintegration.pdf
- ³⁸ http://www.cfr.org/publication/4280/future_of_north_american_integration_in_the_wake_of_the_terrorist_attacks.html
- ³⁹ Wendy Dobson, Shaping the Future of the North American Economic Space, 2002, 26
- ⁴⁰ Paul Michael Wihbey, "Canadian Water: Vital Natural Resource and Tradable Commodity," First Commentary, January 7, 2004, 14-18
- ⁴¹ <http://www.gwest.net/pdfs/first/feoct04.pdf>
- ⁴² Daily Oil Bulletin, GWEST: Alberta/Canada Can Guide World Oil Into The Post-OOPEC Era, October, 2006
- ⁴³ http://policyresearch.gc.ca/page.asp?redir=on&pagenm=rp_nal_evpb&project=NAL&sortby=date
- ⁴⁴ PRI, "Is Water a Tradable Commodity?" January 2007
- ⁴⁵ PRI, "Exporting Canada's Water 1: Outside of NAFTA" January 2005
- ⁴⁶ PRI, "Is there a Business Case for Small-Scale and Large Scale Water Export to the United States? January 2007
- ⁴⁷ PRI, "Is Water a Tradable Commodity?" January 2007
- ⁴⁸ See "Exporting Canada's Water 1: Outside of NAFTA" January 2005
- ⁴⁹ Dixon Thompson, "Water for Sale? A Look At the Complex Issue of Bulk Water Export" Horizons, PRI, May 2006, 28-32
- ⁵⁰ Council On Foreign Relations, Building A North American Community, 2005
- ⁵¹ Task Force on the Future of North America: Summary of the Toronto Meeting (2005) http://www.canadians.org/DI/documents/TF_ReportFeb05.pdf
- ⁵² Natural Resources Canada, Freshwater Issues and the Natural Resource Sectors, January 2006. Documents obtained by Ken Rubin under the Access to Information Act.
- ⁵³ <http://www.csis.org/americas/canada/naim/>
- ⁵⁴ Center For Strategic and International Studies, North American Future 2025 Project, 6-7 http://www.canadians.org/water/documents/NA_Future_2025.pdf
- ⁵⁵ Kelly Patterson, Selling Water On the Agenda At 3-way Talks, Ottawa Citizen, April 13, 2007 <http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=43173e89-e34a-4642-bc1e-5644088b7358>
- ⁵⁶ (For Peschard-Sverdrup's involvement with SPP meetings see: http://www.csis.org/component/option.com_csis_progj/task.view/id,584/)
- ⁵⁷ The Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a SPP supporter, is well aware of these concerns. See CSIS, Global Water Futures, 2005 <http://water.csis.org/publications.html>
- ⁵⁸ Lougheed, November, 2005
- ⁵⁹ General Accounting Office, Freshwater Supply, GAP-03-514, July 2003
- ⁶⁰ http://www.texasep.org/html/wqn/wqn_6fut.html. See also Credit Suisse, Water, Global Equity Research, June 2007, 52
- ⁶¹ Credit Suisse, Water, 49

-
- ⁶² U.S. Geological Survey, "Ground-water Depletion Across the Nation: Fact Sheet 103-303, November 2003
- ⁶³ Dr. Cody Knutson, "US National Drought Policy: Moving from Crisis to Risk Management" C-CAIRN Water Resource Workshop, May 23, 2007 <http://c-ciarn.mcgill.ca/completed.html>
- ⁶⁴ Chris Cobb, "Water, water, everywhere and no one's stopped to think," Ottawa Citizen, May 6, 2007
- ⁶⁵ Center For Strategic and International Studies, US-Mexico Transboundary Water Management: The Case of the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo, January 2003 See also Government of Mexico, The State of Water Resources in Mexico, 2004
http://www.cna.gob.mx/eCNA/Espaniol/Estadisticas/Central/Estadisticas_Agua_2004/PDF/SWM_2004_Chapter3.pdf
- ⁶⁶ <http://www.bvsde.ops-oms.org/bvsacg/e/foro4/17marzo/assessment/subsidies.pdf>
- ⁶⁷ http://www.export.gov/articles/Mexico_MoM.asp
- ⁶⁸ IPCC WGII Fourth Assessment Report: Chapter 14, April 2007, 3
- ⁶⁹ Felicity Barringer, "Water Levels in 3 Great Lakes Dip Far Below Normal, New York Times, August 14, 2007
- ⁷⁰ CNA Corporation, National Security And the Threat of Climate Change, 2007, 32-35
- ⁷¹ US Department of Energy, Energy Demands On Water Resources: Report to Congress On the Interdependency of Energy and Water, December 2006, 14, 29-35
- ⁷² Frederick Cedoz, Scenarios Suggesting A Stronger US-Canadian Energy Partnership, First Commentary, January 2004, 8
- ⁷³ North American Energy Working Group, Security and Prosperity Partnership, Energy Picture Experts Group, "North America-The Energy Picture II" January 2006, 16
<http://www.pi.energy.gov/documents/NorthAmericaEnergyPictureII.pdf> See also Southern States Energy Board, The American Energy Security Study, Norcross, Georgia, July 2006, 2
- ⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 17
- ⁷⁵ http://geo.international.gc.ca/can-am/washington/trade_and_investment/energyrel050328-en.asp
- ⁷⁶ US Department of Energy, Press Release, July 14, 2006 <http://www.doe.gov/news/4059.htm>
- ⁷⁷ Anton Dammer, director of the Energy Department's Office of Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves in Eric Bontrager, "Hill Seminar touts virtues of tapping unconventional sources," Greenwire, June 21, 2007
- ⁷⁸ Pastor, Toward A North American Community, 135
- ⁷⁹ Len Flint, Workshop Working Report: Oil Sands Experts Group Workshop, Houston, Texas, January 24-25, 2006, 1 http://www.rqic.alternatives.ca/psp/os_spp_wwr.pdf
- ⁸⁰ *Ibid*, 5
- ⁸¹ Samuel Bodman, Secretary US Department of Energy, July 14, 2006
<http://www.doe.gov/news/4059.htm>
- ⁸² The project's "environmental footprint" was considered an industry, Alberta and Canadian concern. Len Flint, Workshop Working Report, 14
- ⁸³ (http://ess.nrcan.gc.ca/ercc-rrcc/proj1/theme1/act1_e.php)
- ⁸⁴ David Schindler and Vic Adamowicz, Running Out of Steam? Oil sands Development and Water Use in the Athabasca River-Watershed: Science and Market based Solutions, University of Toronto Munk Centre for International Studies, May 2007
- ⁸⁵ Dan Woynillowicz and Chris Severson-Baker, Down to the Last Drop: the Athabasca River and Oil Sands, Pembina Institute, March 2006, ii
- ⁸⁶ D.W. Schindler, W.F. Donahue and John P. Thompson, Future Water Flows and Human Withdrawals in the Athabasca River, Running Out of Steam? Oil Sands Development and Water Use in the Athabasca River Watershed: Science and Market-Based Solutions, Munk Centre for International Studies and Environmental Research and Studies Centre, University of Alberta, May 2007 http://www.powi.ca/pdfs/running_out_of_steam_final.pdf
- ⁸⁷ David Schindler, interview by author, e-mail, July 27, 2007
- ⁸⁸ Schindler, Running Out of Steam, 9-11
- ⁸⁹ Bruce Peachey, Strategic Needs for Energy Related Water Use Technologies: Water and the EnergyINet, New Paradigm Engineering, February 2005, 34-36

-
- ⁹⁰ Lee Richardson (Chair), *The Oil Sands: Toward Sustainable Development: Report of the Standing Committee on Natural Resources*, House of Commons Canada, March 2007, Chapter 5, 16
- ⁹¹ Brent Soderbergh *et al*, *A Crash Program Scenario for the Canadian Oil Sands Industry*, Uppsala University, 2006, p. 36.
- ⁹² Doug Radke *et al*, *Investing In Our Future: Responding to the Rapid Growth of Oil Sands Development*, Final Report, Alberta Government, December 29, 2006, 130-145
- ⁹³ Dan Woynillowicz, *Oil Sands Fever: The Environmental Implications of Canada's Oil Sands Rush*, Pembina Institute, November 2005, 30-32
- ⁹⁴ *Ibid*. See also Alex T. Jakubick *et al*, *Stabilization of Tailings Deposits: International Experience, Mining and the Environment Conference*, Sudbury 2003
<http://www.ott.wrcc.osmre.gov/library/proceed/sudbury2003/sudbury03/prof77.html>
- ⁹⁵ Jim Byrne, Interview with author. July 3, 2006. E-mail
- ⁹⁶ Mackenzie River Basin Board, *State of the Aquatic Ecosystem Report*, 2003, iv
<http://www.swa.ca/publications/documents/1%20Covers%20Letter%20Contents%20Preface.pdf>
- ⁹⁷ Flint, *Workshop Working Report*, 23
- ⁹⁸ Richardson, *The Oil Sands: Toward Sustainable Development*, Chapter 5, 5
- ⁹⁹ Brent Soderbergh *et al*, *A Crash Program Scenario for the Canadian Oil Sands Industry*, Uppsala University, 2006, 24-30
- ¹⁰⁰ <http://www.cpast.org/Articles/fetch.adp?topicnum=102>
- ¹⁰¹ Peachey, *Strategic Needs for Energy Related Water Use Technologies*, 24. Beijing consumes about 4-billion cubic meters a year. See
<http://www.grandexh.com/water2003/Exhibiting/Market%20Info.htm>
- ¹⁰² Cumulative Environmental Management Association, *Creating Wetlands in the Oil Sands Reclamation Workshop*, August 2006, vi-xv
- ¹⁰³ Conference Board of Canada, *Mission Possible: A Canadian Resources Strategy for the Boom and Beyond*, 2007, 95
- ¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*, 95
- ¹⁰⁵ Council On Foreign Relations, *Building A North American Community*, 18
- ¹⁰⁶ Leon Benoit (Chair) *Standing Committee On International Trade, Evidence*, House of Commons, Canada, Thursday, May 10, 2007, 10-12
- ¹⁰⁷ Joseph M. Dukert, "North American Energy: At Long Last, One Continent" CSIS, October 2005 <http://www.asu.edu/clas/naacts/bna/archive/Dukert.%20North%20American%20Energy%20005.pdf>
- ¹⁰⁸ Sandia National Laboratories See http://www.sandia.gov/energy-water/nexus_overview.htm
- ¹⁰⁹ International Joint Commission, *Protection of the Waters of the Great Lakes – Final Report to the Governments of Canada and the United States* (February 2000).
- ¹¹⁰ Peter Gleick, *The World's Water: 2006-2007*, Island Press, Washington, 2006
- ¹¹¹ Karen Bakker, *Eau Canada: The Future of Canada's Water*, UBC Press, 2007, 170
- ¹¹² David Schindler, *The Myth of Abundant Canadian Water*, Innovation Canada, March-April 2006
- ¹¹³ CBC, *A Sea of Troubles: Lake Winnipeg In Crisis*, 2004
<http://www.cbc.ca/manitoba/features/lakewinnipeg/web.html> For documentation of pollution in St Lawrence see: <http://www.qc.ec.gc.ca/faune/biodiv/en/anthropo/contamination.html>
- ¹¹⁴ Michelle Lalonde, "Everything you need to know for a dinner-party conversation about...blue-green algae," *Montreal Gazette*, August 4, 2007
- ¹¹⁵ David Schindler and W.F. Donahue, "An Impending Water Crisis in Canada's western prairie provinces" *PROC. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA*, 2006;103:7210-7216
- ¹¹⁶ <http://atlas.nrcan.gc.ca/site/english/maps/freshwater/consumption/1>
- ¹¹⁷ Body, *Unnatural Law*, 238
- ¹¹⁸ Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation of North America (CEC), *Factual Record: Pulp and Paper Submission (SEM-02-003)*, June 2006
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/SEM-02-003-FR_en.pdf
- ¹¹⁹ *Ibid*
- ¹²⁰ Frank Quinn, Interview with author. Email. August 5, 2007

-
- ¹²¹ Standing Committee On Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources, “Water in the West: Under Pressure”, November 2005
- ¹²² Natural Resources Canada, Freshwater Issues and the Natural Resource Sectors, January 2006. Obtained under the Access to Information Act by Ken Rubin.
- ¹²³ *Ibid*
- ¹²⁴ Natural Resources Canada, Federal Water Strategy: Groundwater, November 2006. Obtained under the Access to Information Act by Ken Rubin.
- ¹²⁵ Standing Senate Committee On Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources, Water in the West: Under Pressure, 2005
- ¹²⁶ Natural Resources Canada, Federal Water Strategy: Groundwater, November 2006.
- ¹²⁷ Chris Cobb, “Canada: Water, water, everywhere and no one’s stopped to think,” Ottawa Citizen, May 6, 2007
- ¹²⁸ A. Y. Hoekstra and A. K. Chapagain, “Water footprints of nations: Water use by people as a function of their consumption pattern,” *Water Resource Management*(2007):35-48 See also: http://www.wateryear2003.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=5868&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html
- ¹²⁹ Bano B. Mehdi, Hydropower and Climate Change: Workshop Report, C-CIARN Water Resources, March 2-3, 2006
- ¹³⁰ S.P. Simonovic, Dynamic Modeling of Canadian Troubled Waters, 17th Canadian Hydrotechnical Conference, Edmonton, Alberta, August 17-19, 2005, 7
- ¹³¹ Peter Gleick and Jason Morrison, Remaining Drops: Freshwater Resources: A Global Issue, UCLA Blue Books, January 2006
- ¹³² PRI, Is There a Business Case for Small-Scale and Large-Scale Water Export to the United States? 3
- ¹³³ Jeremy Loome, “Alberta Losing Out On Millions: Report,” August 15, 2007
- ¹³⁴ General Accounting Office, Oil and Gas Royalties, 2007 (GAO-07-676R)
- ¹³⁵ Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission, Murray Smith, Transcription of Tapes from Austin Annual Meeting, General Session, October 16, 2006
http://iogcc.state.ok.us/news_presentations_2006_Annual_Meeting.html
- ¹³⁶ Roland Priddle, CCE Canada Think Day, University of Texas at Austin, March 9, 2006
http://www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/thinkcorner/CanadaTD_RPRIDDLE.pdf
- ¹³⁷ <http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/MR/mr116-e.htm>
See also William K. Reilly, Environmental Protection Agency, August 13, 1992
<http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/economy/01.htm>
- ¹³⁸ Judicial Watch, State Department Records Reveal Plans of the “Trinational Environmental Working Group, February 8, 2007 <http://www.judicialwatch.org/6144.shtml>
- ¹³⁹ Alberto Arroyo Picard, Impacts of the North American Free Trade Agreement In Mexico, American Friends Service Committee, November 2003, 26-42
- ¹⁴⁰ Kevin P. Gallagher, Mexico, NAFTA and Beyond, Interhemispheric Resource Centre, September 17, 2004 <http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/NAFTAEnviroKGAmerProgSep04.pdf>
- ¹⁴¹ *Ibid*, 3
- ¹⁴² Sustainable Planning Research Group, Canada’s Environmental Record: An Assessment, David Suzuki Foundation, October 18, 2005
- ¹⁴³ Peter Gleick, March 11, 2003
http://www.pacinst.org/publications/testimony/natl_water_commission_letter_final.pdf
- ¹⁴⁴ Frank Quinn, Water Diversion, Export and Canada-US Relations: A Brief History, Munk Centre for International Studies Occasional Paper, August 2007.
- ¹⁴⁵ Peter Lougheed, “A thirsty uncle looks north,” *The Globe and Mail*. November 11, 2005 A15. Toronto.
- ¹⁴⁶ <http://theyee.ca/Books/2007/06/21/OurWater/>
- ¹⁴⁷ Canada, Government Response to the Report of the Standing Committee On Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2003, 42: “We require a consensus on directions to be taken before we commit ourselves to the establishment of new trilateral institutions or programs.”
<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/GovtResponse-en.pdf>

-
- ¹⁴⁸ Sidney Weintraub, NAFTA: What Comes Next?, Center For Strategic and International Studies, 1994,76
- ¹⁴⁹ Norris Clement et al, North American Economic Integration: Theory and Practice, Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999, 316
- ¹⁵⁰ Robert Pastor, Toward A North American Community, Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, 2001, 3
- ¹⁵¹ Richard Harris, North American Economic Integration: Issues and Research Agenda, Industry Canada Research Publications Program, Discussion Paper Number 10, April 2001, 27-31
<http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/site/eas-aes.nsf/en/ra01809e.html>
- ¹⁵² Joseph M, Dukert, North American Energy: At Long Last, One Continent, Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2005
- ¹⁵³ Robert Pastor, Toward A North American Community, Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, August 2001, 199-145
- ¹⁵⁴ http://www.cfr.org/publication/4280/future_of_north_american_integration_in_the_wake_of_the_terrorist_attacks.html
- ¹⁵⁵ Hakim, 29
- ¹⁵⁶ Earl H. Fry and Jared Bybee, NAFTA2002: A Cost/Benefit Analysis for the United States, Canada, and Mexico, Canadian American Center, Orno, ME, January 2002, 25
- ¹⁵⁷ Peter Hakim and Robert E Litan, The Future of North American Integration: Beyond NAFTA, Brookings Institution Press, 2002, 12
- ¹⁵⁸ Wendy Dobson, Shaping the Future of the North American Economic Space: A Framework For Action, C.D. Howe Institute, April 2002
- ¹⁵⁹ Wendy Dobson, The Future of North American Integration: A Background Paper for The Trilateral Commission, North American regional meeting, Toronto, November 1-2,2002
- ¹⁶⁰ <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/cmte/CommitteePublication.aspx?COM=3272&SourceId=37592&SwitchLanguage=1>
- ¹⁶¹ CCCE, Security and Prosperity: Towards A New Canada-United States Partnership In North America: Profile of the North American Security and Prosperity Initiative, January 2003. In a March 2003 document the CCCE proposes “unrestricted flows of oil, gas, electricity, minerals, agricultural products and construction materials” adding nothing in their proposal requires bulk water trade.
- ¹⁶² <http://www.fina-nafi.org/eng/fina/conseil.asp?langue=eng&menu=fina>
- ¹⁶³ Paul Michael Wihbey, Canadian Water: Vital Natural Resource and Tradable Commodity, First commentary, January 7, 2004, 14-18
- ¹⁶⁴ CCCE, New Frontiers: Building A 21st Century Canada-United States Partnership In North America, April 2004
- ¹⁶⁵ <http://www.fina-nafi.org/eng/conf04/img/NAFI-final-report-2004.pdf>
- ¹⁶⁶ <http://www.oklahomacorridorwatch.com/documentation/NAITCP%20summitreport.pdf>
- ¹⁶⁷ http://www.cfr.org/publication/7454/council_joins_leading_canadians_and_mexico
- ¹⁶⁸ http://www.canadians.org/DI/documents/TF_ReportFeb05.pdf
- ¹⁶⁹ <http://www.cfr.org/publication/8104/>
- ¹⁷⁰ http://www.cfr.org/publication/8104/task_force_urges_measures_to_strengthen_north_american_competitiveness_expand_trade_ensure_border_security.html
- ¹⁷¹ <http://www.doe.gov/news/3289.htm>
- ¹⁷² Council On Foreign Relations, Building A North American Community, 21/33
- ¹⁷³ <http://www.judicialwatch.org/archive/2006/SPPFOIADocsSecVIII.pdf>
- ¹⁷⁴ <http://www.northamericanforum.org/>
- ¹⁷⁵ Peter Loughheed, “It’s Not the Crude,” Globe and Mail, November 11, 2005
- ¹⁷⁶ Michael Byers, Intent For a Nation, Douglas & McIntyre, 2007,202
- ¹⁷⁷ Council of the Americas, Findings of the Public/Private Sector Dialogue On the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America, January, 2006
- ¹⁷⁸ http://www.spp.gov/pdf/security_and_prosperity_partnership_of_north_america_fact_sheet.pdf
- ¹⁷⁹ http://www.commerce.gov/opa/press/Secretary_Gutierrez/2006_Releases/June/15_US_Canada_Mexico_NACC_Launch_rls.htm
- ¹⁸⁰ http://www.pi.energy.gov/documents/NAEWG_Natural_Gas_Workshop_Report.pdf

¹⁸¹ http://toronto.usconsulate.gov/content/textonly.asp?section=about&document=Nay_101006

¹⁸² Policy Research Initiative, *Is Water A Tradable Commodity?*, January 2007

¹⁸³ http://www.canadians.org/water/documents/NA_Future_2025.pdf

¹⁸⁴ Leon Benoit (Chair) Standing Committee On International Trade, Evidence, Thursday, May 10, 2007, 10-12